My dissertation is about conditionals, but it’s also about impossibility and modality more broadly. We talk, think, and reason about impossibilities all the time: in philosophy, in theology, and in more everyday pursuits like reading or discussing fiction. I ultimately argue for a non-vacuous Kratzerian premise semantics. You can read my dissertation abstract here.

I also work on wonky conditionals of many sorts: “counterconventionals,” which aren’t properly counterfactuals, but more like counteractuals that countenance ways that words are used in counterfactual situations considered as actual; what I call “near misses,” which challenge common wisdom about the distinction between subjunctive and indicative conditionals; and colloquial counteridentials (If I were you,…, etc.). Other philosophy of language work is on words like whatever and whoever, which I argue have a secondary dimension of meaning that parallels free choice term. This causes difficulties for “Kripke’s test” for distinguishing Donnellan’s “attributive” and “referential” distinction in definite descriptions. I’m also interested in language and the law, and in particular how language is involved in establishing and maintaining power over certain groups, as well as when words and other expressions cause harm.

Aside from philosophy of language, I’ve been working recently on the narrative roles of players in role playing games, as well as conventions around truth and meaning in the RPG setting. I’m also working on a paper critiquing a certain consequentialist argument for thoroughbred racing.

Please email for sharable drafts.

My sidest of side projects compares the semantics and pragmatics of mad, hella, and wicked. This promises to be my great contribution to philosophy.